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This paper explains the occurrence of export subsidy competition and a series of 
accusations by the exporters that follows it, and also examines the welfare implications of 
the WTO agreement that prohibits export subsidies for the countries concerned and the 
world as a whole. It is shown that the welfare of the exporter with low costs of production is 
higher when export subsidization is permitted than when it is prohibited. Furthermore, the 
world as a whole is better off when exporting countries subsidize their exports. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the WTO regards an export subsidy as a prohibited subsidy according to 
the agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter referred to as the 
WTO agreement) and allows plaintiffs to adopt appropriate retaliation measures, some 
countries still subsidize their exports in order to strengthen their competitive positions, 
this giving rise to export subsidy competition among exporting countries. They then 
accuse each other regarding the adoption of export subsidies through the WTO and 
follow this with a series of trade disputes. As an illustration, Canada and Brazil have 
since 1996 been accusing each other with regard to the adoption of export subsidies for 
civil aircraft. 
Typical models in strategic trade theory, such as those of Brander and Spencer (1985), 
Eaton and Grossman (1986), Helpman and Krugman (1989), and Janeba (1998), assume 
that there are two firms located in different countries that produce at home and export 
their commodities to a third country. These studies show that the exporting country 
could subsidize its exports in order to increase its national welfare through profit shifting 
if the firms compete in a Cournot fashion. However, it needs to be asked why export 
subsidy competition exists among exporters and why the accusations that follow it occur. 
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Furthermore, who benefits from the WTO agreement, and what are the conditions? Does 
the WTO agreement make the world better off or worse off? These issues will be 
explored in this paper and various welfare implications of the WTO agreement for 
related countries and the world as a whole will be offered.   
As in the typical strategic trade theory models, such as Brander and Spencer (1985) 
and Collie (1994), we model the trade policy game as a multi-stage game. That is, at the 
beginning of the game the respective governments of the exporting countries decide 
whether or not to follow the WTO agreement. If a government decides to adopt an 
export subsidization policy, an export subsidy will be set to maximize the national 
welfare during the next stage. During the final stage, the firms will choose their outputs 
to maximize profits given the export subsidies set by the governments. The appropriate 
solution for the multi-stage game is the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is obtained 
by a process of backward induction. It can be seen from this that the welfare of the 
country whose exporting firm has low-cost production technology is higher when 
exports subsidies are permitted than when they are prohibited. Furthermore, the world as 
a whole is better off when exporting countries subsidize their exports. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. 
Section 3 explains in detail the occurrence of subsidy competition among exporters and 
the accusations by them that follow. Whether or not the WTO agreement is applicable to 
every exporting country is examined in Section 4. Analyses of the welfare arising from 
the WTO agreement in relation to the consuming country and the world as a whole are 




2.  THE  MODEL 
 
Assume that the industry being analyzed is composed of two exporting firms 
competing in a Cournot fashion that are respectively located in the domestic and foreign 
countries. All consumers are located in a third country. Domestic (foreign) country 
variables are represented by a subscript or superscript 1(2). The domestic (foreign) firm 
has constant average variable cost and marginal cost  ) ( 2 1 c c  and fixed cost  ) ( 2 1 f f . 
The domestic (foreign) firm exports  ) ( 2 1 q q   to the third country, and hence total sales in 
the third country equal  2 1 q q Q + = . The price in the third country is given by the linear 
inverse demand function  Q Q P β α − = ) ( . The domestic (foreign) government uses an 
export subsidy of  ) ( 2 1 s s  per  unit. 
The firms simultaneously and independently choose their outputs to maximize 
profits given the export subsidies set by the two governments. The profits of the 
domestic and the foreign firms are 
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The first-order conditions for a Cournot equilibrium are 
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Solving for the Cournot equilibrium yields the exports of the domestic and the foreign 
firms and the market price as a function of the domestic and the foreign export subsidies: 
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Assuming that there is an interior solution so that  i qi ∀ > , 0 , the following conditions 
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Since we assume that there is no consumption in the exporting countries, the welfare 
of the domestic (foreign) country is represented by the profits of the domestic (foreign) 
firm less the export subsidy payments: 
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The welfare of the consuming country, referred to as Country 3 that does not produce 
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After introducing the basic model, the export subsidy game and various welfare 




3.    EXPORT SUBSIDY COMPETITION AND TRADE DISPUTES 
 
We now turn to the question as to why export subsidy competition induces trade 
disputes. Both governments simultaneously and independently choose their policy to 
maximize their national welfare, and each exporting country is faced with two choices: 
to either follow or to violate the terms of the WTO agreement. Therefore, there are four 
possible policy combinations. The possible outcomes of this game are presented in Table 
1 where V represents “violating” and F represents “following” the WTO agreement, the YU-TER WANG  26 
first subscript represents the policy adopted by the domestic country (i.e., Country 1), 




Table 1.    The Welfare Sets for Countries 1 and 2 for Various Policy Combinations 
Country  1       Country  2  V   F  
V  ) , (
2 1
VV VV ω ω  ) , (
2 1
VF VF ω ω  
F   ) , (
2 1
FV FV ω ω  ) , (
2 1
FF FF ω ω  
 
 
3.1.    When both exporting countries subsidize their exports   
(i.e., violate the WTO agreement) 
 
If at stage zero of the game both governments decide to subsidize their exports (i.e., 
violate the WTO agreement), they will simultaneously and independently choose their 
export subsidy level to maximize the national welfare at stage one. Differentiating (5) 
and using (3) and (4) yields the first-order conditions: 
 
j i j i s s c c s d d j i j i i
i ≠ = = − − + − = , 2 , 1 , , 0 9 ) 4 2 ( β α ω .                 ( 7 )  
 
Solving for the optimal export subsidy yields 
 
j i j i c c s j i i ≠ = > + − = , 2 , 1 , , 0 5 ) 2 3 (
* * α ,                              ( 8 )  
 
where the superscript  ∗ ∗   represents the optimal level in this case. Substituting (8) into 
(3) and (4) yields the exports of the domestic and the foreign firms, as well as the market 
price: 
 
j i j i c c q j i i ≠ = + − = , 2 , 1 , , 5 ) 2 3 ( 2 β α ,                               ( 9 )  
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Substituting (9) and (10) into (5) yields the domestic and foreign welfare 
 
j i j i c c j i
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3.2.    When one exporting country follows and the other violates the WTO agreement 
 
If the government of exporting country i decides to follow the WTO agreement and 
the government of exporting country j decides to subsidize its exports at stage zero, then 
0 = i s and the optimal export subsidy awarded by the government of exporting country j, 
∗
j s , is solved by the first-order condition for welfare maximization 
 
j i j i s c c s d d j j i j
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where the superscript  ∗ represents the optimal level in this case. Substituting  0 = i s  
and (13) into (3) and (4) yields the exports of country i and country j, and the market 
price: 
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Substituting (14)-(16) into (5) yields the domestic and foreign welfare when the 
domestic government follows and the foreign government violates the WTO agreement:   
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and the domestic and foreign welfare when the domestic government violates and the 
foreign government follows the WTO agreement:   
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3.3.    When both exporting countries follow the WTO agreement 
 
If at stage zero both governments choose to follow the WTO agreement, that is, 
0 1 = s  and  0 2 = s , substituting the export subsidy value into (3) and (4) yields the 
exports of the domestic and the foreign firms, respectively, as well as the market price: 
 
j i j i c c q j i i ≠ = + − = , 2 , 1 , , 3 ) 2 ( β α ,                                ( 2 1 )  
 
3 ) ( 2 1 c c P + + = α .                                                  ( 2 2 )  
 
Substituting (21) and (22) into (5) yields the domestic and foreign welfare when both 
governments follow the WTO agreement: 
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3.4.    The best policy choice of exporting countries 
 
Using (11) and (17) to compare the domestic welfare when both governments violate 
the WTO agreement with the welfare that results when the domestic government follows 
and the foreign government violates the WTO agreement yields: 
 
0 400 ) 2 3 ( 7
2
2 1
1 1 > + − = − β α ω ω c c FV VV .                                 ( 2 4 )  
 
Therefore, the domestic welfare is lower if the domestic government does not subsidize 
its exports than if it subsidizes its exports when the foreign government adopts an export 
subsidy policy.   
Using (19) and (23) to compare the domestic welfare when the domestic government 
subsidizes its exports and the foreign government follows the WTO agreement with the 
resulting welfare when both governments follow the WTO agreement yields: 
 
0 72 ) 2 (
2
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1 1 > + − = − β α ω ω c c FF VF .                                   ( 2 5 )  
 
Clearly, the domestic welfare is greater if the domestic government subsidizes its 
exports than if it does not when the foreign government adopts a free trade policy. From 
the above, setting an optimal export subsidy at stage one is a dominant strategy for the 
domestic government regardless of whether the foreign government subsidizes its 
exports or not. 
Similarly, using (11), (18), (20) and (23) yields:   
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0 72 ) 2 (
2
2 1
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which indicates that adopting an export subsidy policy at stage one is also a dominant 
strategy for the foreign government regardless of the policy adopted by the domestic 
government. 
Accordingly, in the subgame perfect equilibrium both the exporting countries will 
violate the WTO agreement at stage one, even though doing so will not necessarily be 
better than where both exporting countries follow the WTO agreement at stage one in 
the case of all the individual exporters.
1 In other words, the welfare of an individual 
exporter may be lower when all exporters subsidize their exports than when they do not, 
but no subsidy on exports will make the exporter worse off if its rivals decide to 
subsidize their exports. This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: If there is no intervention, the dominant strategy for any exporting 
country is to subsidize its exports (i.e., violate the WTO agreement) regardless of 
whether its rivals adopt an export subsidy policy or a free trade policy. 
 
Thus, for the WTO agreement (i.e., a free trade policy) to be followed, a sufficient 
penalty will be necessary so that 
1 1
VV FV ω ω > , 
1 1
VF FF ω ω > , 
2 2
VV VF ω ω > , and 
2 2
FV FF ω ω > . 
The threat of penalty will make the free trade policy a dominant strategy for any 
exporting country if the penalty is indeed put into effect once an exporter violates the 
agreement. This implies: 
 
Corollary 1: For the WTO agreement on export subsidies to be followed, the imposition 
of a sufficiently large penalty on countries that subsidize their exports will be necessary. 
 
Therefore, the WTO agreement allows its member countries to retaliate against an 
exporting country that violates the agreement. When both exporting countries violate the 
WTO agreement, it is very likely that a series of accusations and retaliations among the 
exporters will follow. 
 
1 Using (9), (10), (21) and (22) yields 
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i q )  represent the market price and the exports of firm i  when both 
governments violate (follow) the WTO agreement. It can be seen that subsidizing exports reduces the market 
price but does not necessarily increase exports. YU-TER WANG  30 
4.    CONDITIONS BENEFICIAL TO THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
 
From the previous section, we know that each exporter will adopt an export subsidy 
policy when export subsidization is permitted and will only adopt a free trade policy if 
export subsidization is prohibited by means of an effective penalty. However, it still 
needs to be asked under what conditions the WTO agreement is beneficial for the 
exporting countries. This is the focus of the following discussion. By using (11) and (23) 
to compare the welfare of the exporting countries when each exporter in the industry 
subsidizes exports with that resulting when they adopt a free trade policy at stage one 
yields: 
 
β α α α α ω ω 225 ] ) ( 47 ) )( ( 116 ) ( 62 [
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VV ω ω ) (< >  as 
y
i i c c ) (> < . That is, the WTO agreement 
is beneficial for the exporting countries with high average variable cost (i.e., 
y
i i c c > ), 
but it is not fitting for the countries with low average variable cost. The intuition is that 
for each exporter with low average variable cost not only does an export subsidy policy 
bring it a higher profit than a free trade policy, but also the incremental profits outweigh 
the subsidy payments made by the government. 
 
Proposition 2: For the countries whose exporting firm has a low average variable cost 
of production, the outcome where both countries subsidize exports is better (or 
Pareto-superior) than the outcome where both countries adopt a free trade policy. 
 
However, in the special case with  2 1 c c = , (28) reduces to 
 
. 2 , 1 , 0 225 ) ( 7
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This means that when the two competing countries have identical marginal cost the 
outcome where both countries follow the WTO agreement is Pareto–superior to the 
outcome where both countries subsidize exports. 
 
 
5.    THE WELFARE OF THE CONSUMING COUNTRY 
 
If at stage one both the exporting countries subsidize their exports (i.e., violate the 
WTO agreement), substituting (9) into (6) yields the welfare of the consuming country: 
 
β α ω 25 ) 2 ( 2
2
2 1
3 c c VV − − = .                                          ( 3 0 )  
 
Substituting (14) and (15) into (6) yields the welfare of the consuming country when 
the domestic government violates and the foreign government follows the WTO 
agreement at stage one: 
 
β α ω 32 ) 2 3 (
2
2 1
3 c c VF − − = ,                                           ( 3 1 )  
 
and the welfare of the consuming country when the domestic government follows and 
the foreign government violates the WTO agreement at stage one: 
 
β α ω 32 ) 2 3 (
2
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Substituting (21) into (6) yields the welfare of the consuming country when both 
exporting countries follow the WTO agreement at stage one:   YU-TER WANG  32 
β α ω 18 ) 2 (
2
2 1






VV VF FF ω ω ω < < , 
3 3 3
VV FV FF ω ω ω < < , 
 
which implies that the welfare of the consuming country reaches its highest level when 
both exporting countries subsidize their exports, its second highest level when only one 
exporting country violates the WTO agreement, and its lowest level when both exporting 
countries follow the agreement.
3 Thus, the well-known result that the consuming 
country benefits from foreign export subsidies can be further enhanced as: 
 
Proposition 3: Foreign export subsidies always benefit the consuming country, and the 
larger the number of exporting countries that adopt export subsidization, the higher will 
be the consuming country’s welfare. 
 
 
6.    THE VIEWPOINT OF WORLD WELFARE 
 
From the viewpoint of world welfare, the question that needs to be asked is whether 
it is better to permit export subsidization or to prohibit it. Since there are only three 
countries involved in this export subsidy game, the world welfare when export 
subsidization is permitted and that when it is prohibited can be compared by using (11), 
(23), (30), and (33): 
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That is, the possible losses of the exporting countries are more than offset by the benefits 
to the consuming country when an export subsidy policy instead of a free trade policy is 
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3 Bagwell and Staiger (1997) assume that the exporting firms compete in a Bertrand fashion and face 
positive fixed costs of production, and that only one firm profits in the market. It is shown that export subsidy 
competition among exporting countries can make both consuming countries and the whole world worse off 
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adopted. Therefore, the world welfare is greater when export subsidization is permitted 
than when it is prohibited. 
 
Proposition 4: The welfare of the world as a whole will be greater when the WTO 
agreement is relaxed, so that exporting countries can subsidize their exports, than when 
the WTO agreement is required to be followed. 
 
It is noted that subsidizing exports may lead to distortion in resource allocation 
within the exporting countries, a possibility that is not considered in this model. 
 
 
7.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
This paper shows that, for every exporting country, subsidizing exports is a 
dominant strategy regardless of whether the rivals adopt an export subsidy policy or a 
free trade policy if there are no penalties for non-compliance. Consequently, a 
sufficiently large penalty needs to be imposed on those exporters that violate the WTO 
agreement if a country is to abandon its export subsidy policy. Furthermore, from the 
analysis we also learn that every exporting country will accuse the other exporting 
countries of violating the agreement in order to prevent them from receiving subsidies 
on their exports, thereby resulting in an increase in the accuser’s welfare. As a result, 
accusations among exporters will follow an export subsidy competition. 
Furthermore, it is found that a country whose exporting firm has low-cost production 
technology will be better off when export subsidization is permitted. The WTO 
agreement is available when the exporting countries have high production costs or their 
production costs are identical. Therefore, the WTO agreement does not always improve 
the exporters’ welfare. On the other hand, as is well known, the consuming countries 
will always benefit from the subsidies of the exporting countries and the benefits will 
increase as the number of countries subsidizing exports increases. Finally, our analysis 
shows that the possible losses of the exporting countries will be more than offset by the 
benefits of the consuming countries when export subsidization is adopted, i.e., the 
welfare of the world as a whole will be higher when export subsidization is permitted 
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